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Abstract: News outlets worldwide increasingly adopt user- and system-driven personalisation to 
individualise their news delivery. Yet, the technical implementation of news personalisation 
systems, in particular the one relying on algorithmic news recommenders (ANRs) and tailoring 
individual news suggestions with the help of user data, often remains opaque. In our article, we 
examine how news personalisation is used by quality and popular media in three countries with 
different media accountability infrastructures - Brazil, the Netherlands, and Russia - and investigate 
how information about personalisation usage is communicated to the news readers via privacy 
policies. Our findings point out that news personalisation systems are predominantly treated as 
black boxes that indicate a significant gap between practice and theory of algorithmic transparency, 




Today, newsreaders worldwide increasingly consume news online, and this leads to 
profound changes in how the traditional media produces and disseminates news 
content (Mitchelstein & Boczkowski, 2010). The shift to digital distribution, togeth-
er with the growing availability of data about audiences (including individual read-
ing habits), enables new possibilities for making content selection and delivery 
more individualised for each reader. The options for personalised news distribu-
tion are many; they vary from customisable subscriptions to specific topics/authors 
(user-based personalisation) or individually tailored news suggestions generated 
via algorithmic news recommenders (ANRs) 1 (system-driven personalisation). Un-
like user-based personalisation, which is grounded on explicit user decisions (e.g., 
choosing a specific subscription mode or following a certain topic), system-driven 
personalisation relies on implicit data about user activity (e.g., what news stories 
are read or how much time is spent on a specific page) that are utilised to suggest 
content that the system views as interesting or relevant to the user. 
The use of news personalisation, in particular in its system-driven form, is viewed 
as an important strategy for news outlets (Newman, 2018). The individualised 
news distribution allows news organisations to be responsive to consumers’ infor-
mation needs while ensuring traffic, consumption, and revenue through user tar-
geting and profiling (Karimi et al., 2018). However, the technical implementation 
of news personalisation systems, especially the ones relying on ANRs that auto-
matically draw insights from personal user data to generate individually tailored 
content recommendations, often remains obscure to news consumers and practi-
tioners alike (Diakopoulos & Koliska, 2017). 
With regard to personalised systems of news delivery, this lack of transparency is 
not a trivial issue, considering the possible impact of news personalisation on indi-
vidual consumers and society at large. Some scholars (Penney, 2017; Stoycheff, 
2016) argue that personalisation can increase anxiety (or “chilling effects”) among 
news consumers who feel that their online behaviour is being monitored. Person-
alisation has also been argued to threaten the democratic role of the media by im-
pacting the provision of non-discriminatory access to information and the readers’ 
right to receive information (Eskens et al., 2017; Zuiderveen et al., 2016). Filter 
1. In this article, we treat ANRs as a class of recommender systems that are utilised by the news me-
dia “to filter incoming streams of information according to the users’ preferences or to point them 
to additional items of interest in the context of a given object” (Karimi et al., 2018, p. 1203). For 
more information about ANRs and the effects that their deployment can have on the public sphere 
and media functions, see Bastian et al. (2019), Bodó et al. (2019), Harambam et al. (2018, 2019), 
Helberger (2019), Möller et al. (2018), and van Drunen et al. (2019). 
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bubbles (Pariser, 2011), which limit the variety of information that individuals re-
ceive from the mass media and can potentially polarise society, have been espe-
cially prominent in this discussion. Although empirical research (Dubois & Blank, 
2018; Möller et al., 2016, 2018) has so far found little evidence supporting the ex-
istence of filter bubbles, the possibility that personalised information distribution 
can lead to information inequalities or amplify existing biases and thus undermine 
the integral functions of the media in democratic societies cannot be excluded 
(Helberger et al., 2019). Understanding the workings of personalisation systems – 
in particular the ones based on ANRs – is therefore of crucial importance, and the 
news media is responsible for explicating whether and how it uses personalisation 
technologies. This is, however, easier said than done in the case of system-driven 
personalisation, as explaining the workings of algorithmic systems is notoriously 
difficult (Pasquale, 2015). 
In this paper, we ask how these challenges are tackled by contemporary mass me-
dia by exploring how the presentation of news personalisation varies between the 
digital outlets of the quality (or broadsheet) and popular (or tabloid) press in dif-
ferent countries. Similar to Hanusch (2013), we define the difference between the 
two types in terms of “content and form rather than publication size” (p. 499). The 
tabloid press tends to produce more sensationalist – or even scandalous – con-
tent, which often promotes iconoclastic views (Bastos, 2016), and combines this 
with emotional appeals (Örnebring & Jönsson, 2004). While doing so, it often aims 
to entertain, rather than inform or educate, the audience; this leads to a decrease 
in journalistic standards, which is a common source of criticism of the tabloid 
press (Chadwick et al., 2018; Esser, 1999). In contrast, the broadsheet press relies 
on more in-depth reporting and prioritises “hard news coverage, fact-checking, and 
research based on a timeline in which the story unfolds” (Bastos, 2016, p. 218); 
this is viewed as an integral condition for fulfilling the democratic functions of the 
media (Berry, 2009). 
A number of studies have investigated the differences in the adoption of digital in-
novations by quality and popular media (see, for instance, Jönsson & Örnebring, 
2011; Karlsson & Clerwall, 2012; Karlsson & Clerwall, 2013); however, to our 
knowledge, none has looked at the differences in using and communicating the 
use of personalisation between broadsheets and tabloids, especially from a com-
parative cross-country perspective. While the question of whether the type of out-
let (i.e., popular or quality) influences the adoption of technological innovation re-
mains an open one, we agree with Jönsson and Örnebring (2011), who argue that 
because of their more popular (or sometimes populist) nature, tabloids seem to be 
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more inclined to adopt new technologies, including the ones related to the ways 
in which the readers interact with the content. Similarly, despite the current lack of 
comparative research on the adoption of personalisation systems across different 
countries, 2 the existing studies on media innovation and its adoption suggest that 
these processes develop differently for specific media systems and media markets 
(Hanusch et al., 2019). 
The above-mentioned factors motivated our decision to use a comparative ap-
proach to investigate how personalisation systems are adopted by different types 
of media outlets in different media systems. Using a sample of 12 newspapers 
from Brazil, the Netherlands, and Russia, we qualitatively examine which personal-
isation strategies are used and how they are communicated to their audiences. 
While doing so, we look at both user-driven and system-driven personalisation 
from the point of view of the user to determine whether the popular media outlets 
present the use of personalisation differently from the quality ones. As part of this 
comparison, we also look at the differences in communicating the use of personal-
isation between outlets coming from different media systems to investigate the 
degree to which such communication can be influenced by different contextual 
factors, such as the countries’ media accountability infrastructures. 
To answer our main research question – that is, how the use of news personalisa-
tion is communicated by quality and popular media in different media systems – 
we start by identifying the news personalisation practices that are used by the 
news media. First, we examine the front-end features of their digital outlets to de-
termine which (if any) forms of personalisation can be observed from a user per-
spective. Second, we explore how these outlets communicate their personalisation 
practices to users: more specifically, we focus on the presentation of personalisa-
tion through formal privacy policy documents. While doing so, we investigate how 
transparent and intelligible these communication procedures are and whether 
there are meaningful differences between outlets, depending on their types and 
the cultural contexts in which they operate. 
Theoretical background 
In recent decades, the news landscape has changed drastically due to the rise of 
digital technologies (Macnamara, 2010; Meyer, 2009; Van der Haak et al., 2012). A 
concomitant aspect of this computational turn in journalism (Coddington, 2015) is 
2. For some exceptions, see Bastian and Helberger (2019), Makhortykh and Wijermars (2019), 
Makhortykh and Bastian (2020), Sørensen and Hutchinson (2018), and Van den Bulck and Moe 
(2018). 
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the possibility for news organisations to track what news people consume and 
how. Many newsrooms today use such audience metrics to inform various kinds of 
editorial decision-making and adapt their products if necessary (Anderson, 2011; 
Lee & Tandoc, 2017; Petre, 2015), but they are also used as input data for person-
alising news delivery. These personalisation technologies enable news organisa-
tions to customise their contents to the (assumed) interests of readers, and they 
are seen as one of the most promising innovations in the news industry (Newman, 
2018). 
The use of news personalisation, in particular system-driven personalisation based 
on ANRs, raises a variety of societal and academic concerns. The first is privacy: 
news organisations can now actively track people’s online reading behaviour, but 
what do they actually monitor, and for what purposes? ANRs need user data to do 
their work, so there is always a trade-off between privacy and personalisation (Li 
& Unger, 2012); however, it is often unclear what data news organisation collect to 
personalise news delivery and whether they “enrich” these with user data collected 
by third parties or even share these data with them. This form of surveillance, even 
if deployed for arguably benign goals, may cause so-called chilling effects – a 
form of self-censorship in the face of coercive threats (Penney, 2017; Stoycheff, 
2016). 
While the collection of personal data for personalising news content delivery does 
not necessarily trigger the same concerns for the users as government surveillance 
does, there is a possibility that corporate profiling also leads to the same effects, 
although the current lack of empirical research does not allow this assumption to 
be proved or disproved (Büchi et al., 2019). However, considering that personalised 
commercial offers are known to increase privacy concerns as participants become 
aware of their data being collected and used (Aguirre et al., 2016), we suggest that 
the deployment of personalisation by news media can result in the chilling effects 
caused by the newsreaders’ awareness that the outlet knows or is even predicting 
their information preferences. People may think twice about what they read, which 
limits their right to information (Balkin, 2009; Eskens et al., 2017). Moreover, what 
rights people have regarding the protection of their own personal data is in many 
contexts rather unclear. While the adoption of the General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR) in 2018 provided the European Union (EU) with a well-defined legal 
framework that sets a high bar for (algorithmic) transparency, the way in which its 
open norms apply to specific contexts, such as news personalisation, is far from 
straightforward and can even differ between EU member states (Erdos, 2016; Es-
kens, 2019). It therefore remains to be seen what obligations, such as the GDPR’s 
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requirement to “provide meaningful information about the logic involved [in profil-
ing]” (art. 13–15), mean for online newsreaders. 
A second concern relates to the role of the media in democratic societies and the 
fear of increasing societal polarisation. The news media plays an important role 
here as it (should) create(s) collective realities and form(s) arenas for public de-
bate, wherein a variety of sources, voices, and perspectives can be discussed 
(Hampton, 2010; Muhlmann, 2010; Starr, 2005). The diversity of media outlets and 
their contents is seen as a key requirement for performing this democratic role 
(Hardy, 2014; Helberger, 2011; Karppinen, 2013). It has been argued that recom-
mender systems threaten the media’s role in democracy, as they are assumed to fo-
cus on satisfying user information preferences based on previous histories of inter-
action and can thereby isolate users from alternative opinions and new topics by 
creating echo chambers (Sunstein, 2017) and filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011). Howev-
er, recent studies (Bruns, 2019; Dubois & Blank, 2018; Möller et al., 2018) question 
whether these effects exist, at least with regard to the general public, and point 
out that news personalisation can also promote diversity (Möller et al., 2016) and 
help the media realise its societal functions in democratic societies (Helberger, 
2019). 
Furthermore, research suggests that rather than valuing systems of personalised 
delivery that give readers more of the same content, there is an audience demand 
for information diversity (Bodó et al., 2019). The practical implementation of diver-
sity through software design in the context of news personalisation is, however, a 
complicated task, as it can be operationalised in different ways, ranging from au-
tonomy-focused perspectives, which aim to suggest content that allows readers to 
realise their own interests, to adversarial perspectives, which value suggestions 
that challenge users’ existing beliefs (Helberger et al., 2018). This complexity rais-
es multiple questions, such as the following: What responsibility do media organi-
sations take for the diversity of their personalisation systems? What kind of indi-
vidual and collective effects or diversity do they speak about or promote? And do 
they speak about their individual and collective effects, or do they promote more 
diversity-centred ANR? 
Third, the opacity of the algorithmic systems that undergird news personalisation, 
in particular its system-driven forms, is a concern shaping public and academic de-
bates about individualised content delivery (Burrel, 2016; Pasquale, 2015; Stohl et 
al., 2016). Transparency has played a key role in the operationalisation of the me-
dia’s accountability to its audiences and the general public (McBride & Rosenstiel, 
2013). However, newsreaders generally have little understanding of how personal-
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isation systems work, why certain news is recommended to them, or how to inter-
vene when needed (Bucher, 2017; Eslami et al., 2015; Fletcher & Nielsen, 2019). 
This lack of transparency is a wider societal problem: it prevents civil society from 
learning more about algorithmic systems and holding the organisations that im-
plement them to account (van Dijck et al., 2018). It thus allows algorithms to dis-
tribute resources across populations with little public accountability (Diakopoulos, 
2016) and fuels urgent calls for their regulation (Pasquale, 2015; Ziewitz, 2016). 
While algorithmic systems are notoriously difficult to understand (Gillespie, 2014; 
Kitchin, 2017), there are efforts to make their implementation in the news sector 
more transparent to enable media accountability (Diakopoulos & Koliska, 2017; 
Hindman, 2017) or to increase the control options so that the newsreaders can use 
these systems more effectively (Harambam et al., 2018). It is difficult to predict 
whether these changes will make it to the market, but there is certainly a desire 
and need for more explanations amongst newsreaders (Harambam et al., 2019; ter 
Hoeve et al., 2017). In addition to facilitating action by individual newsreaders, 
transparency rights for users or the public can be used to power collective action 
and reduce power asymmetries (Ausloos & Dewitte, 2018). Several civil society 
groups (e.g., Algorithm Watch, Panoptykon Foundation, and Tactical Tech) focus on 
using algorithmic transparency as a means to enforce media accountability. 
These concerns – privacy, diversity, and transparency – will guide us in the analy-
sis of how media organisations communicate the use of news personalisation. In 
doing so, we challenge the tendency to take a Western-centric perspective on 
these concerns and call for a more contextualised view of them. James Whitman 
(2003) already noted a difference between some Western countries with regard to 
the meaning of privacy (specifically by looking at differences between the United 
States and Europe), and the urgent need for the de-Westernisation of journalism 
and communication research has been highlighted by numerous scholars (Hardy, 
2008; McQuail, 2000; Wang, 2011). Empirical evidence has also shown significant 
differences in journalism cultures and media systems worldwide (Brüggemann et 
al., 2014; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Hanitzsch et al., 2011; Willnat et al., 2013) and 
more specifically in terms of media accountability (Bastian, 2019; Fengler et al., 
2014). 
The latter concept of media accountability serves as the starting point of our study 
and is defined as “any non-State means of making media responsible towards the 
public” (Bertrand, 2000, p. 108). We emphasise the importance of accountability 
because it encompasses not only the journalistic work of media companies but al-
so their ethics and societal role. The differences in media accountability infrastruc-
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tures that exist at the local level (Bastian, 2019) contrast with privacy discussions 
that emphasise the potential universalising impact of European data protection 
law on other countries (i.e., the so-called “Brussels effect”; Bradford, 2012). Not 
only does the GDPR apply directly to non-EU organisations that monitor the be-
haviour of EU residents, but companies can also voluntarily apply European data 
protection law globally to avoid the technical, economic, and reputational difficul-
ties of maintaining different privacy policies. At the same time, European data pro-
tection law can also influence non-EU legal systems indirectly by functioning as a 
model from which other countries can draw inspiration when creating their own 
national data protection legislation (Azzi, 2018; Bradford, 2020). To go beyond the 
usual focus on Western media systems, we selected three countries with different 
types of media accountability infrastructures: Russia, the Netherlands, and Brazil. 
We chose these countries to identify similarities and differences in the ways in 
which different media systems deal with privacy and transparency issues regarding 
news personalisation. In the following sections, we will shed more light on these 
issues – first by discussing our methodology and then by detailing our findings. 
Methodology 
Sampling and data collection 
To conduct this qualitative study, we selected a sample of 12 news outlets (six 
quality newspapers and six popular newspapers) from three countries: Brazil, the 
Netherlands, and Russia. Below, we will discuss the rationale for our choices while 
we made the selection – in particular our choice of the countries and specific out-
lets to compare. 
Country selection 
Our choice of countries was based on the assumption that local news industries 
are characterised by profound distinctions originating from a diverse set of cultur-
ally negotiated journalistic values and attitudes towards transparency, audience 
participation, and self-regulation, thus impacting the media accountability land-
scape. This assumption is based on comparative studies using concepts such as 
“journalism cultures” (Hanitzsch, 2011) or “media systems” (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004) to trace the differences between journalistic organisations and routines at 
the local level. These differences are also known to influence the process of adopt-
ing media innovations as shown by multiple studies on media innovation and its 
adoption (see, for instance, Hanusch et al., 2019; Humprecht & Esser, 2018; Lehti-
saari et al., 2018; Nozal Cantarero et al., 2020; Toepfl & Litvinenko, 2018) that 
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suggest that these processes develop differently for specific media systems and 
media markets. 
As media accountability is influenced by the relationship between the media on 
the one hand and the government and political sphere on the other (Bastian, 
2019), the role of the state in the media sector already reveals important informa-
tion about the media accountability infrastructure. Whereas in the Netherlands, 
both sectors are comparatively disconnected (Groenhart & Evers, 2017), the Brazil-
ian media landscape is closely connected to the political sphere, depending on the 
outlet and the respective political actor in terms of either proximity or harsh oppo-
sition (Lima, 2011; Matos, 2009). Even more noticeably, the Russian state has an 
extensive influence on the media system, amongst others through the strong pa-
ternalistic tradition and intense instrumentalisation of the mass media by the rul-
ing elites to secure political gains both domestically and internationally (see, for 
instance, Akhrarkhodjaeva, 2017; Rotaru, 2018; Vartanova, 2012). 
Influenced by this role of the state and other characteristics of the respective me-
dia systems, media accountability infrastructures differ significantly: “the hybrid 
statist-commercialised nature of the Russian media system [...] influences not only 
authentic journalism culture but accountability practices as well” (Vartanova & 
Lukina, 2017, p. 223). More concretely, transparency plays a role in the Russian 
case through the publication of self-regulatory documents and the trend to im-
prove “the quality of public dialogue with users [...] and [the] transparency of jour-
nalism subjects” (Vartanova & Lukina, p. 223). 
In contrast to the Russian scenario, the Dutch one shows a different distribution of 
responsibility and influence among actors. Here, an increasing awareness of media 
accountability and transparency can be observed among the public, the political 
sector, and the media sector. 3 Because of the lack of both governmental interfer-
ence and active efforts by the public to hold journalists accountable, the media 
sector is characterised by higher media accountability (Groenhart & Evers, 2017). 
Interestingly, privacy plays an important role in the Dutch media accountability 
sector because in addition to professional media guidelines on how to cover the 
political far right, its guidelines focus “mostly on [the] privacy protection of sus-
pects and criminals” (Groenhart & Evers, 2017, p. 174). Transparency is a valued 
mechanism in the Dutch context, as evidenced by a variety of policy papers pub-
3. For the public in particular, see the results of Eurobarometer (2019), which indicate a considerable 
increase in public awareness of the authorities’ responsibility for protecting their data rights, com-
pared with 2015. 
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lished by Dutch news organisations. Increasingly finding new ways to get in touch 
with the audience is a further characteristic of the Dutch media accountability 
landscape, though it is applied to differing degrees by different media organisa-
tions (Groenhart & Evers, 2017). Furthermore, the Netherlands is the only country 
in our sample where the GDPR requirements for transparency and accountability 
are immediately applicable. 
These sharp differences between media organisations are visible in the Brazilian 
media landscape as well. Although a general trend towards more transparency can 
be observed in Brazil too, outstanding best-practice examples exist alongside very 
opaque organisational practices (Bastian, 2019). The relationship to the public 
holds a special role in the Brazilian context because of several reasons: first, the 
country maintains a tradition of social movements and public demands for the de-
mocratisation of the public sphere and the communication sector, and second, nei-
ther the media organisations themselves nor the content they distribute adequate-
ly represent the rich (cultural and geographical) diversity of the country (Bastian, 
2019). This intense relationship between all three parties – the media, the public, 
and the political sector – and the respective differences between the Brazilian, 
Russian, and Dutch media accountability infrastructures give reason to expect 
these differences to be reflected in the documents that are analysed in this study. 
Media selection 
In addition to the comparison of the different ways in which local news outlets 
communicate their algorithmic practices, we investigated the difference between 
quality (broadsheet) and popular (tabloid) news outlets. Our decision to introduce 
this criterion of sampling is based on the alleged difference between quality and 
popular media in terms of adopting new technological solutions (Jönsson & Örne-
bring, 2011; Karlsson & Clerwall, 2013). More specifically, it relies on the assump-
tion that popular media may be more open to innovations that are designed to en-
tertain or better target their users (e.g., by attracting more clicks; Karlsson & Cler-
wall, 2013). Similarly, we expect quality newspapers to be more responsive to soci-
etal concerns about privacy and the use of these new technologies. 
TABLE 1: Sample of news outlets (by country and type) 









Argumenty i Fakty 
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OUTLET TYPE BRAZIL NETHERLANDS RUSSIA 
QUALITY 







Based on these two criteria, we selected two quality and two popular outlets for 
each of the three countries, as shown in Table 1. As a primary selection criterion, 
we used the audience size based on the publicly available estimations from the 
end of 2017 to the beginning of 2018 (see Mediascope [2018] rankings for Russia, 
rankings by Grupo de Mídia São Paulo [2018] for Brazil, and SVDJ data [Bakker 
2018] for the Netherlands). The secondary criterion was related to the use of per-
sonalisation by the respective outlet. The personalisation could be either a user-
driven one (e.g., the possibility of subscribing to a certain author or topic) or a sys-
tem-driven one (e.g., the individualised selection of stories in the “Recommended 
for you” section); if at least one of the types of personalisation was used, we in-
cluded the outlet in our sample. The assessment of the presence/absence of per-
sonalisation was made via a close examination of the digital versions of the re-
spective outlets and the testing of different options for disseminating the content. 
Because we were particularly interested in what is visible to the newsreader by 
default (i.e., without a substantial commitment to the news organisation, which 
would, for instance, involve buying a subscription), our examination of the use of 
personalisation focused on the front-end features that are accessible without go-
ing beyond a (possible) paywall. 
For Russia, we chose the following four press outlets: Mosskovskii Komsomolets, Ar-
gumenty i Fakty, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, and Izvestiia. All four outlets are federal-level 
and predominantly pro-government newspapers; they are also daily newspapers, 
with the exception of Argumenty i Fakty, which is weekly. With a daily circulation 
of 606,000 copies, Rossiiskaia Gazeta is the youngest of the four newspapers (it was 
founded in 1990) and serves as the official outlet of the government of the Russian 
Federation. Izvestiia (1917) was the official outlet of the Soviet government but 
was privatised following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and currently has a 
daily circulation of 322,900 copies. Mosskovskii Komsomolets (1919; current circula-
tion of 513,200 copies a day) and Argumenty i Fakty (1978; current circulation of 
4,572,700 copies per week) are two popular outlets with a strong focus on enter-
tainment content. Unlike the quality outlets mentioned above, both Mosskovskii 
Komsomolets and Argumenty i Fakty have multiple regional editions. 
Officially, only Rossiiskaia Gazeta is state-owned; the other three newspapers are 
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commercial enterprises. However, in all three cases, there is a strong relationship 
between commercial owners and the Russian state that reflects a tendency for po-
litical parallelism in the Russian media system (Vartanova, 2012). All four newspa-
pers have digital versions, which are available free of charge without any addition-
al paywalls. The subscriptions for all four outlets (around 16 euros per month on 
average; the most expensive is Izvestiia at approximately 30 euros per month for 
the subscription) provide physical copies of the respective newspaper that are de-
livered by post. 
In the case of Brazil, we selected the following newspapers: Super Notícia, Extra, O 
Globo, and Folha de S. Paulo. Both popular newspapers – Super Notícia and Extra – 
are relatively recent outlets that were founded in 2002 and 1998, respectively. 
With their low purchase price, their target group is very broad; the newspapers aim 
predominantly at the poor and working class. According to Grupo de Mídia São 
Paulo (2018), Super Notícia has a daily circulation of 219,200 copies, whereas Extra
has a circulation of 116,500. In contrast, founded in 1921, Folha de S. Paulo is one 
of the oldest newspapers in the sample and is the one with the largest daily circu-
lation (300,500 copies). Its competitor O Globo has a circulation of 240,900 copies. 
Their primary target group is well-educated Brazilians. Brazilian media organisa-
tions have often been active in political developments; the most explicit example 
is probably O Globo, which is criticised for the fact that it supported and benefited 
from the military regime. 
For the Netherlands, we chose De Telegraaf and Algemeen Dagblad, which represent 
the popular press, and the quality newspapers NRC Handelsblad and Het Financieele 
Dagblad. With a circulation of more than 350,000 copies, De Telegraaf, which was 
founded in 1893, is the largest Dutch daily newspaper. Algemeen Dagblad, which is 
a more recent daily newspaper, was founded in 1946 after the Second World War 
and has a circulation of approximately 300,000 copies. Unlike De Telegraaf, which 
has a single nationwide version, Algemeen Dagblad has multiple regional versions 
(similar to the Russian popular outlets we selected). NRC Handelsblad (1970) and 
Het Financieele Dagblad (1943) have smaller circulations than their popular com-
petitors and produce around 80,000 and 50,000 copies a day, respectively. 
Unlike Russian outlets, whose digital newspaper versions were not paywalled, 
Dutch outlets usually required a subscription in order to access the full content. 
The price varied substantially between quality outlets (from 26 to 42 euros per 
month) and popular outlets (between 4 and 12 euros per month). For the popular 
outlets, the subscription included access to the so-called “premium” articles, 
whereas for quality media, it served as a means of getting behind the paywall, ap-
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pearing after the reader viewed a few freely available articles. 
In summary, the selection criteria of this explorative study are based on the notion 
of diversity. We have included different media systems and different types of news-
papers to explore the width and depth of how newspapers engage with societal 
concerns regarding personalisation. Therefore, the focus of this study lies in find-
ing similarities and differences between quality and popular media in different 
countries. By selecting the most popular newspapers that enable (any form of) per-
sonalisation, we ensured that we focus on the cases which are important for the 
respective media systems. Because this is an explorative qualitative study, its aim 
is not to find law-like generalisations across time and place, but to advance the 
current understanding of the ways in which the use of ANRs is communicated by 
news organisations to their readers. 
Data analysis 
After establishing a sample of news outlets for our study in July–August 2018, we 
proceeded to the analysis of front-end communication practices related to the use 
of algorithmic recommendation. Specifically, we focused on privacy policies both 
because of their importance (i.e., as binding legal agreements between content 
providers and users) and because of their explainability potential (i.e., being a ma-
jor source of available information for users about the ways in which their data are 
processed and collected) (Wilson et al., 2016). 
We divided our analysis into two sections. In the first section, we summarised the 
front-end personalisation features used in our sample. We started by visiting the 
site (from an internet protocol [IP] address in the EU) and examining the type of 
personalisation that is visible to the users (user- or system-driven), and then we 
looked at the accessibility of the privacy policies (how easy/difficult it is to locate 
them on the websites of the respective organisations). Finally, we examined the ti-
tle of the website section discussing the matters of personalisation and privacy to 
check for possible differences between the country- or type-based categories of 
outlets. All of these steps were conducted using a desktop device, so the findings 
below are applicable to a rather specific scenario – that is, the users engaging 
with the news outlet via its native website and accessing it via the desktop brows-
er. We also took into account sponsored – that is, third-party – news materials 
(e.g., news from partner organisations) that were found on the website and includ-
ed these in our analysis if such materials were disseminated with the help of user- 
or system-driven personalisation. 
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In the second section of our analysis, we focused on the communication of person-
alisation in the privacy policies of news organisations. For this purpose, we used a 
document analysis approach to find out in more detail how newspapers communi-
cate their personalisation practices (Bowen, 2009). Our analysis focused on seven 
theoretically informed characteristics of privacy policies that feature prominently 
in the studies dealing with data protection and privacy (see, for instance, Ausloos 
& Dewitte, 2018; Kuner, 2005; Kuner et al., 2016; Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2013). These characteristics are as follows: a) the 
mentioning of personalisation; b) the complexity and type of language (formal/col-
loquial) used; c) the kind of data collected; d) the purposes of the data collection; 
e) data storage and sharing; f) data processing; and, finally, g) data subject rights. 
Both steps of the analysis were conducted by three of the authors of this paper in 
September 2018. To implement the analysis, the authors used Google spread-
sheets. The contents of the privacy policy documents were coded according to the 
set of questions (e.g., Is personalisation visible on the website? What type of per-
sonalisation is mentioned in the privacy policy?) concerning the visibility of front-
end personalisation features (step 1) and the seven characteristics of privacy poli-
cies listed above (step 2). The results were then discussed in a series of personal 
meetings. Because the analysis required knowledge of Dutch, Portuguese and 
Russian, each author was conducting analysis for the specific country in the lan-
guage in which he or she was most proficient. 
To minimise potential researcher bias, we used concise and simple questions in 
the case of front-end personalisation features (i.e., to decrease the possibility of 
disambiguation and disagreement among the coders) and discussed the coded 
parts of the privacy policies among the coders. Despite this, we cannot fully ex-
clude the possibility of some of our interpretations being influenced by translation 
bias caused by the stronger or weaker emphasis placed on certain aspects of per-
sonalisation communication by coders working with a particular language. To ad-
dress this, the coding results were checked by other authors (in the cases in which 
their language knowledge allowed for it – i.e., Brazilian and Dutch), and disagree-
ments were discussed among the authors. A similar procedure was used in the cas-
es in which the main coder had doubts concerning the attribution of a particular 
policy aspect to one of the above-mentioned characteristics. In these cases, the 
section dealing with the respective aspect was translated by the coder and dis-
cussed with the other two authors to consensus-code it. While other sources of 
bias can also influence our findings (e.g., the fact that all the coders are profes-
sional scholars could imply a more positive attitude towards quality media com-
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pared with popular ones), we assume that the use of clear criteria to identify the 
presence or absence of specific features related to personalisation communication 
should limit the possible effect of such biases. 
Front-end personalisation 
Personalisation visibility 
We started our analysis by looking into front-end personalisation features. Our ob-
servations suggest the absence of substantial differences in the type of personali-
sation used by quality and popular media in all three countries. In almost half of 
the cases (five out of 12), we detected a combination of both types. System-driven 
personalisation is more commonly used by the Brazilian and Russian outlets, 
whereas the Dutch ones focus more on user-driven personalisation. Furthermore, 
we found that quality media tends to offer user-driven personalisation services 
more often. While this observation can hardly be viewed as generalisable consid-
ering the size of our sample, it raises the question of whether the provision of 
more control to the users via user-driven personalisation can be part of quality 
news services. 
Our analysis indicates that for the majority of outlets, system-driven personalisa-
tion features are presented through subsections on the front page and sub-pages. 
The titles of these subsections vary: in addition to “Recommended for you”, we 
found “Read also”, “What else to read”, “Partner stories” and “World is close”. The 
format of the personalised subsections is rather similar: each of these usually in-
cludes three to five links to the news stories, and they are often accompanied with 
story-related images. 
User-driven personalisation is mainly offered through mail-based updates. Not all 
of these updates are personalised per se; this is especially the case with editorial 
newsletters that include the major news events of the day (Argumenty i Fakty). Oth-
er options are more individualised, such as in the case of individual subscriptions 
for specific stories (Rossiiskaia Gazeta). One particularly interesting example is the 
user-driven service MyNews, which is offered by the Dutch quality outlet (Finan-
cieele Dagblad). After free registration, it allows the readers to compose their own 
personalised news feeds by choosing which topics to follow. The list of topics 
varies from “Media” and “Stocks” to “Donald Trump” and “Technology”. Further-
more, the service provides an option to label certain articles as “Favourites” and to 
see one’s “Recently read articles”. 
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Accessibility of privacy policies 
Following the examination of the types of personalisation that are used, we 
looked at the location and accessibility of the privacy policies. In the case of the 
Netherlands, all outlets present a cookie notification before readers can enter the 
sites. These notifications inform the readers about the tracking of their personal 
data on these sites and provide links to the more detailed cookie statements. The 
cookie notifications vary both in terms of their length and language style. In the 
case of popular media (Telegraaf and Algemeen Dagblad), the notifications are 
rather long and formal, whereas quality media (NRC Handelsblad and Financieele 
Dagblad) put more effort into making their notifications clearer and more under-
standable. 
Neither the Brazilian nor Russian outlets use cookie notifications to inform users 
before they access the websites. This distinction can be attributed to the absence 
of EU-style data protection legislation. Instead, three out of four Brazilian outlets 
make their privacy policies visible at the bottom of the front pages. An exception 
is the popular outlet Super Notícia, whose privacy policies are detectable only after 
going through several sub-pages and reaching the larger news portal, O Tempo. In 
the case of Russia, accessing privacy policies is a non-trivial task: the privacy state-
ments of Mosskovskii Komsomolets and Izvestiia are accessible only through several 
sub-pages (including ones with rather non-intuitive titles, such as “Third-party Ad-
vertisements” in the case of Mosskovskii Komsomolets). In other cases (Rossiiskaia 
Gazeta and Argumenty i Fakty), links to the privacy policies are offered only during 
user registration on the respective portals. 
Names of privacy sections 
Finally, we examined how websites’ sections on privacy policies were named. Simi-
lar to our observations on accessibility, we identified major differences between 
countries and not between media types. Both the Dutch and Brazilian outlets 
specifically referred to privacy in the sections’ names, using titles such as “Privacy” 
and “Privacy Policies”. In contrast, the Russian outlets tended to avoid such norma-
tive references: both quality outlets used the title “User Agreement”, one popular 
outlet (Argumenty i Fakty) called it “Confidentiality Politics”, and another discussed 
privacy in the “Third-Party Advertisements” section. 
The lack of references to normative concepts (i.e., privacy) in the case of Russia 
can be attributed to the slow adaptation of Russian data protection to the chang-
ing digital landscape (Kukushkina et al., 2017). Despite the rapid deployment of 
cutting-edge technologies (e.g., online tracking and behavioural advertising) by 
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Russian media industries, corresponding regulations have not yet been developed. 
Together with the weak civil society (Brenchenmacher, 2017) and growing use of 
online surveillance (Gainutdinov, 2017), these reasons may contribute to the limit-
ed visibility of privacy matters in the documents of Russian news media. 
Personalisation and privacy policies 
The mention of personalisation 
We started our analysis by examining references to personalisation in privacy poli-
cies. We found that only half of outlets actually mention personalisation, which is 
usually done by providing a general reference to “personalised services and offers” 
(Izvestiia, n.d.). With the exception of Financieele Dagblad, which provides a de-
tailed description of its user-driven personalisation system, references to personal-
isation generally remain vague and are usually presented as an extra reason to 
justify personal data collection and not as a specific service. 
The vagueness of personalisation references is reflected in the lack of differentia-
tion between advertisement and news personalisation, particularly in the non-EU 
quality outlets. While popular outlets (Super Notícia and Mosskovskii Komsomolets) 
often explicitly inform their readers about the use of advertisement personalisa-
tion, the quality outlets in Brazil and Russia tend to use more ambiguous lan-
guage. O Globo, for instance, mentions personalisation without further specifica-
tion; similarly, Izvestiia rather generally refers to personalised services without ac-
tually specifying which (editorial or commercial) content is personalised. 
The lack of differentiation between types of personalisation results in a lack of 
clarity about their technical distinctions. For instance, it is unclear whether the 
same types of user data (e.g., demographic information or content interaction his-
tory) are used by both advertisement and news personalisation. The absence of 
such information not only limits the ability of users to control the algorithmic sys-
tems used by the specific outlet but also makes it harder to determine what forms 
of personalisation are actually at work. Such obscurity highlights the possibility of 
blending commercial and normative aspects of personalisation and limits users’ 
ability to control what information they receive (e.g., by preventing users from opt-
ing out of a specific form of personalisation because advertisement and news per-
sonalisation are not differentiated from each other). 
The complexity and type of language used 
After examining how privacy documents referenced personalisation, we evaluated 
the general use of language in relation to news personalisation. Our observations 
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point out that the majority of quality news sources, together with some popular 
outlets, use rather colloquial language to communicate the use of personalisation. 
One illustrative example comes from the Dutch quality outlet NRC Handelsblad 
(n.d.), which explicitly states that “journalism is our product, not your data” and de-
tails its “privacy promises” with simple rhetorical questions, such as “Does NRC sell 
your data?”, followed by simple answers: “No. Never. Nowhere”. 
In some cases, news outlets adopt more formal language, for instance, by referring 
to specific legislative documents or using jargon or technical terms. For instance, 
Financieele Dagblad (2019) describes in detail how it interacts with Amazon Web 
Services; however, despite their significant informative value, statements such as 
“We have only given a very limited, minimum required number of employees ac-
cess to the data. And only if this is necessary for the performance of the function. 
Moreover, access to the data is only authorised for that part of the data that is nec-
essary for the execution of that function” are probably not very engaging for the 
readers. 
The kind of data collected 
Following the examination of the language of privacy policies, we moved towards 
analysing the way in which these documents discuss the use of newsreaders’ data. 
The first part of our analysis – data collected by the outlet – indicates substantial 
similarities between popular and quality outlets. With the exception of Russia, 
where popular outlets which we examined remain rather tight-lipped about data 
collection (e.g., by making formal references to Russian data protection legisla-
tion), outlets of both types list a number of types of user data that are collected. 
Generally, the types of data listed depend on the service that is used (e.g., sub-
scriptions, advertisement/special offers, or contact forms for approaching the news 
outlet). 
The majority of outlets differentiate between two major categories of data. The 
first category includes data provided by the reader during registration or explicitly 
added after registration. Such data include name, surname, region, telephone num-
ber, email address, postal address, location, photo, date of birth, links to personal 
profile on social networking sites, and so on. The second category involves data 
collected automatically through the reader’s interaction with the website; these in-
clude user IP, cookies, browser type, device type, time of access, address of request-
ed page, and user-agent data. 
A number of outlets also note that they use data about their readers, which they 
acquire from third parties. All Russian outlets that we reviewed present demo-
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graphic user profiles in the advertisement sections; these profiles are based on 
personal data collected by the unspecified third parties. Similarly, one Dutch popu-
lar outlet, De Telegraaf, mentions that it enhances its data with user data from third 
parties, such as customer database companies. Other Dutch news organisations 
(Financieele Dagblad and Algemeen Dagblad) state that they merge their user data 
with the data provided by their partners who participate in a joint digital advertis-
ing initiative called “Buymedia”. 
The purposes of the data collection 
After identifying different types of collected data, we examined the declared pur-
poses of this data collection. With the exception of the Russian popular outlets, 
which scarcely note data collection, all outlets cite a number of reasons for col-
lecting their users’ data. The two most common purposes (referenced by 10 out of 
12 privacy policies) are communication with customers and improvement of news-
paper services. 
The former purpose includes both general communications (e.g., for processing 
user requests) and targeted advertisements (e.g., pushing updates about new of-
fers). A similarly broad interpretation is used in relation to the second purpose: the 
services mentioned in the documents vary from the general improvement of the 
outlets’ products, due to a better understanding of how readers use digital ser-
vices, to more concrete tasks, such as optimising the interactive experience of 
users’ navigation on the website (O Globo and Folha de S. Paulo). 
We noticed that normative concepts are rarely used to communicate the purposes 
of data collection. The majority of outlets tend to describe data collection in rather 
instrumentalist terms and imply that it is necessary to optimise the services that 
are provided to the users. The single exception to this rule is found in the case of 
NRC Handelsblad, which states explicitly that it uses data collection not to build 
user profiles or to follow readers on the internet, but to improve its journalism. 
Data storage and sharing 
In contrast to the relatively detailed description of user data collection and its pur-
poses, privacy policies usually remain obscure about data storage. Such obscurity 
is particularly pronounced in the case of the popular outlets in our sample, in par-
ticular the two Russian ones, which ignored the matter of data storage completely. 
When data storage is mentioned, it is often described in general terms that leave 
significant space for interpretation. For example, Rossiiskaia Gazeta (n.d.) notes that 
it “stores personal data but puts significant organisation and technical effort to 
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protect users’ personal information from illegal or accidental access according to 
the legislation of the Russian Federation” (without specifying concrete legislative 
acts). Similarly, Folha de S. Paulo (2018) notes that it will use “all means required to 
protect data confidentiality, integrity, and availability”. 
Concrete specifications regarding the geographical location of data storage and 
the length of the storage period are mentioned exclusively by quality media. The 
degree of concreteness varies significantly between countries and can be attrib-
uted to the different legislative contexts (e.g., the GDPR in the EU, which explicitly 
requires organisations to disclose who will receive the users’ data, how long the 
data will be stored, and any intention to transfer the data outside of the EU). The 
Brazilian outlets, for instance, state that data will be stored in the companies’ 
databases, which can be accessed only by authorised and qualified persons, but do 
not specify the geographical locations of their databases. The Dutch outlets ex-
plicitly mention the period of data storage, which varies from six months to five 
years depending on the specific regulations. Furthermore, one of these outlets (Fi-
nancieele Dagblad) states that it stores all user data in one central data warehouse 
environment, which is physically located on the European mainland. 
Concerning data sharing, almost all news outlets note that they can share user da-
ta with third parties. Usually, outlets state that they can share users’ data with 
partners that are involved in their business operations (e.g., suppliers, software 
builders, and advertising agencies), as well as with (tax) authorities, if this is re-
quired by legislation. The scale of this sharing and the degree of transparency 
about relations with third parties vary between countries. For instance, the two 
quality Russian outlets in our sample – Izvestiia and Rossiiskaia Gazeta – note that 
they can share data with third parties in cases that fall under Russian legislation 
(without, however, specifying such cases), whereas the popular Russian outlet 
Mosskovskii Komsomolets notes that it collaborates with third parties for advertise-
ment purposes, which can permit the third parties to put cookies on user machines 
to identify them. Both quality and popular Brazilian outlets in our sample are simi-
larly vague in terms of disclosing the degree of third-party data sharing and men-
tion that some third-party partners can request users’ personal information from 
them (O Globo and Extra), whereas the Dutch outlets that were examined tend to 
provide more comprehensive information about their third-party sharing (e.g., giv-
ing concrete examples of what kind of data is shared with which parties [De 
Telegraaf] or noting the presence of processor agreements with the third parties 
that regulate such sharing [NRC]). 
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Data processing 
Among all the issues related to data use, the actual processing of user data re-
mains particularly obscure. In all three countries, the privacy policies of the 
analysed media mention that personal data are used for analytical purposes, but 
the exact procedures remain unclear. This is particularly true in the case of popu-
lar outlets, which usually omit the subject of data processing completely. The 
quality media (Izvestiia and Rossiiskaia Gazeta in Russia) note that readers’ data can 
be used for statistical and other types of research and that the research will rely 
on anonymised data (Rossiiskaia Gazeta) and comply with legislation (Izvestiia); 
however, no concrete details are provided. The obscurity of data-processing prac-
tices leaves a conceptual gap in the communication about news personalisation in 
both the EU and non-EU contexts. While readers are informed about the types of 
collected user data and the purposes for which these data are used, they remain in 
the dark about what happens between the data collection and the generation of 
outcomes. Whether or not readers are profiled, let alone how, is not described in 
the privacy policies. 
Data subject rights 
In the final part of our analysis, we examined how the privacy policies approach 
the topic of data subject rights. Our comparison indicates that only the Dutch out-
lets devote special attention to the rights of users regarding their personal data. 
This difference can be viewed as another example of the impact of the GDPR on 
the media industry. The respective sections are found in the privacy policies of all 
Dutch outlets, which detail the right of users to request all the data collected on 
them and, if needed, delete these data. The quality outlets (Algemeen Dagblad and 
NRC Handelsblad) also include the contact details of the official Data Protection Of-
ficer, who can be contacted for matters related to users’ data rights. 
In the case of the Brazilian and Russian outlets, the subject of data rights is gener-
ally absent. Among four Russian outlets, only two newspapers touch the subject. A 
popular outlet (Argumenty i Fakty) notes that if users believe that their rights are 
breached as part of data processing, they can contact the newspaper by email. 
However, it is unclear which actual person is behind the email address mentioned 
by Argumenty i Fakty. In the second case, a quality newspaper, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 
mentions that users own their data, but these data include only content that is 
produced through interactions with the website (e.g., comments or photos shared 
by users). While Rossiiskaia Gazeta also mentions the personal data of users (i.e., 
items viewed), it does not state whether users own the data or not and whether 
they can request or access the data. 
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Conclusions and discussion 
While some organisations are transparent about the data they collect, the way in 
which the news media utilise the data of their users to personalise content deliv-
ery generally remains obscure. In line with the findings from the 2018 Reuters re-
port (Newman, 2018), 4 our analysis reveals a common usage of user- and system-
driven personalisation in all three examined countries. However, this use of per-
sonalisation is rarely mentioned in the formal documents available to newsread-
ers, such as privacy policies. Even when personalisation is mentioned explicitly, it 
is often unclear whether the term refers to advertisement personalisation, news 
personalisation, or both. It is similarly unclear which data or techniques are used 
to implement personalised content delivery. 
At the same time, the disclosures indicate that data collection becomes more in-
tense for more committed readers as a result of their increasing use of services 
and the growing exposure of their reading behaviour. In many cases, these two 
processes amplify one another, as the use of additional services and the removal of 
paywalls enable more engaged reading and thereby more intense collection of 
readers’ data. This leads to a situation in which more committed readers are in-
creasingly subjected to the effects of personalisation systems that largely remain 
black boxes to them. In particular, due to this power asymmetry, those readers who 
intensively use personalised content delivery systems (to exercise their right) to 
receive information are put in a vulnerable position. While the degree of influence 
currently remains unclear, as well as the degree to which users would be eager to 
familiarise themselves with the information about personalisation and change 
their behaviour, 5 we argue that the observed obscurity of personalisation systems 
deprives newsreaders of the opportunity to understand how exactly their data are 
used and the degree to which this usage conforms to their privacy expectations. 
This stands in sharp contrast to current policy discussions on algorithmic trans-
parency and accountability. Such discussions have long since moved beyond argu-
ing for the disclosure of data collection practices and towards the need for in-
creased transparency of the algorithms that use these data and the resulting out-
put (Diakopoulous & Koliska, 2017). The GDPR’s right to an explanation has fea-
tured prominently in this discussion, and it is typically argued that the public is at 
least entitled to information regarding the algorithms’ existence and general func-
4. Specifically, three quarters of the surveyed media organisations actively use or plan to start using 
artificial intelligence techniques to provide better content recommendations to their users. 
5. These concerns are particularly high in the context of privacy policies, which are rarely read by 
users (see, for instance, McDonald & Cranor, 2008; Nissenbaum, 2011; Steinfeld, 2016). 
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tioning, if not explanations of specific algorithmic decisions (Kaminski, 2019; 
Wachter et al., 2017). Similarly, upon its entry into force 6, Convention 108+ from 
the Council of Europe, of which Russia and the Netherlands are signatories and 
Brazil is an observer, will provide users with the right to request information re-
garding the reasoning underlying data processing. Beyond these discussions of 
legally required information, recent work has called for further transparency re-
garding, for example, counterfactual explanations or information about the output 
of algorithmic decision-making processes (Diakopoulous & Koliska, 2017; Wachter 
et al., 2017a). 
Such transparency is a prerequisite for achieving the goals of data protection gov-
ernance. Though disagreements remain over what exact information needs to be 
disclosed and to whom, organisations cannot be held accountable for the ways in 
which they use algorithms if their existence, functioning, and output are kept se-
cret. This is true, first, at the individual level, where transparency serves as a pre-
condition for the individual control tools that continue to be central to data pro-
tection law (Ausloos & Dewitte, 2018; van Drunen et al., 2019). User empower-
ment takes on added significance in the context of the media, in which it continues 
to function as a tool that can offer users some protection in the absence of stricter 
media regulation. At the same time, the fact that many users do not necessarily 
read nor act on the information that is provided to them (Nissenbaum, 2011) am-
plifies the important role that public-facing transparency can play in producing ac-
countability either as a result of the disciplinary action by a few motivated individ-
uals or through more collective pressure that is exercised through civil society or 
other media professionals (Ausloos & Dewitte, 2018). Though such parties are less 
hampered by the complexity of the language we identified, the ambiguity or plain 
lack of information also continues to hamper accountability from this perspective. 
Our analysis shows that in practice, algorithmic transparency in the media lags far 
behind not only discussions of what information regarding algorithmic decision-
making should be disclosed but also what information is argued to be required un-
der the GDPR and soon Convention 108+. This indicates that more work needs to 
be done not only to propose new transparency requirements but also to find a con-
sensus regarding what the minimal open transparency norms required by the 
GDPR are and how these norms can best be enforced. Until the gap between prac-
tice and discussions on algorithmic transparency is closed, algorithmic account-
6. The Convention will enter into force either when all parties will ratify it or on 11 October 2023 if 
there would be 38 parties to the Protocol at this date. Currently (i.e., in October 2020), the Conven-
tion is ratified by eight parties (Council of Europe, n.d.). 
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ability studies that presume the availability of such information will need to take 
into account the fact that it is often unclear whether and how (news) personalisa-
tion is occurring. 
The comparison between quality and popular media showed a few differences in 
the ways in which they approached news personalisation. Based on the limited 
sample that we used, quality media tends to provide more options for user-driven 
personalisation (i.e., self-tailored news feeds based on email notifications) by giv-
ing readers more control over the selection of news to consume. Furthermore, 
quality outlets offer more information about data storage and the purposes of data 
collection compared with popular outlets, in particular in the case of the non-EU 
countries (Brazil and Russia). The distinction between quality and popular media is 
likely not explained by data protection law, which treats quality and popular media 
alike; it may instead find its roots in the different expectations of the audiences, 
the media’s use of transparency to build trust, or the differences in media systems. 
It is important to note, however, that because of the size of our sample, these ob-
servations can be treated only as exploratory findings and that further research is 
required to make them generalisable. 
The presence of such differences within the Netherlands also indicates that while 
the EU sets a high transparency bar for all media organisations to follow, there is a 
difference between quality and popular media in terms of meeting the require-
ments. Our observations indicate that quality media organisations tend to disclose 
more information in a more understandable manner that can be explained by their 
willingness to comply with legislation in a more intelligible manner that distin-
guishes them from popular media. In addition to the media’s ethical benefits, in-
vestments in transparency, explainability, and a solid relationship with the user 
could strengthen the media’s position vis-à-vis its competitors in terms of the trust 
and loyalty of its readers and could showcase the distinction between the ways in 
which the legacy and social media use personalisation. Research from both the 
perspective of trust in the media and trust in the use of data suggests a modest re-
lationship between trust and engagement (Curry & Stroud, 2019; Felzmann et al., 
2019; Strömbäck et al., 2020). However, emerging research that combines the two 
perspectives by analysing how trust in the media is affected by its data usage sug-
gests a more complex picture: although indiscriminate data collection may erode 
the media’s trustworthiness, readers’ assessment of the media’s data collection dis-
closures is influenced by both their trust in the media organisation and in online 
data collection more generally (Sørensen & Van den Bulck, 2020; Steedman et al., 
2020). 
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Finally, the cross-country comparison revealed a number of major differences con-
cerning both the basic aspects of personalisation communication, such as the type 
of language used (e.g., the limited number of references to the normative concept 
of privacy in the context of personalisation communication in the case of the Russ-
ian media outlets that were included in the sample), as well as the interpretation 
of more specific concepts, such as data storage (e.g., clear definitions of the stor-
age time/physical location of data storage in the case of the Netherlands). Mirror-
ing Groenhart and Evers’s (2017) assessment of policy documents being an indica-
tor of media accountability, the media organisations’ disclosures in privacy policies 
matched the broader media accountability infrastructure of their respective coun-
tries. The Netherlands, which has the most advanced media accountability infra-
structure in our sample, is also the country where transparency and explainability 
are reflected most obviously in our data. Media organisations in both Brazil and (to 
a slightly greater degree) Russia, where the media accountability infrastructure 
suffers from greater shortcomings, are more hesitant to provide detailed informa-
tion about their personalisation mechanisms. Many of these distinctions can also 
be attributed to contextual factors (especially legal regulations, such as the GPDR 
in the Netherlands) that emphasise the importance of context in analysing person-
alisation practices in different environments. 7 This arguably reflects the added 
value of the GDPR, as its clear transparency obligations (e.g., regarding data col-
lection and user rights) are reflected in our analysis. 
At the same time, the strong differences between countries that are evident in our 
analysis give a different practical perspective to current discussions on the inter-
nationalisation of data protection law. Even though “[t]he EU sets the tone global-
ly for privacy and data protection regulation” (Bradford, 2020, p. 132), our analysis 
indicates that strong differences remain between the countries regardless of any 
extraterritorial impact of European data protection law. This may indicate that the 
internationalisation of data protection law finds obstacles in sectors such as the 
media, which remains focused on national audiences, which are intertwined with 
the states in which they operate (in the case of Russia), and which, in the case of 
the EU, continues to be subject to a lesser degree of legal harmonisation (Erdos, 
2016). At the same time, legal convergence is continuing. Brazil is in the process of 
adopting a GDPR-style regulation, and Russia has signed on to Convention 108+ 
and its stronger (algorithmic) transparency requirements. Future research will 
7. Interestingly, the attitudes of journalists towards media laws and regulations differ in the three 
types of journalism cultures: Hanitzsch et al. (2011) showed that a large proportion (42.1%) of 
Russian journalists consider media laws to be very or extremely influential, whereas Brazil scored 
32.5%, and the Netherlands scored as low as 11.4%. However, at that time, the GDPR had not yet 
been introduced, and its presence might have led to different results. 
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track whether this legal convergence translates into increased algorithmic trans-
parency (and accountability) in practice. 
Another aspect of future research on personalisation communication that is impor-
tant to acknowledge is scaling of analysis, which will allow researchers to go be-
yond exploratory investigation and enable them to draw more generalisable con-
clusions about the relationship between media types or systems and the commu-
nication of algorithmic innovation. To implement such research, it will be impor-
tant to look at a broader range of news outlets and to consider different scenarios 
in which news personalisation communication occurs. For the current study, we did 
not look at the scenarios in which users employ mobile browsers and/or mobile 
applications to access news from the respective outlets; however, we plan to do so 
in a follow-up study to determine whether there are any differences in the use of 
personalisation and its communication between desktop and mobile devices. 
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